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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CAROL FOWLER, 
Defendant-Appellant• 
Case No. 860208-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
This appeal is from a conviction of second degree 
felony theft after a trial in the Fourth District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2a-3(2) (e) (Supp. 1986). 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the 
State presented sufficient evidence at trial to prove all of the 
elements of theft beyond a reasonable doubt? 
mi£HE£I_QE_XB£_£&££ 
Defendant, Carol Fowler, was charged with theft, a 
second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-6-404 and -412 
(1978) (R. 19). After a bench trial, the court found her guilty 
of the charged offense (R. 56-58). The court then sentenced 
defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of one to fifteen 
years and ordered her to pay restitution in the amount of $72,000 
(R. 63-64, 67) • Upon defendant's application for a certificate 
of probable cause, the court issued a certificate, stayed 
execution of the sentence, and ordered defendant released upon 
her own recognizance (R. 65# 69). 
The statutes pertinent to the issues raised on appeal 
are set forth in the body of the brief. 
miEMEMI_QE_EAClS 
The essential facts in this case are not in dispute* 
Over a two year period, defendant sought and received substantial 
sums of money totalling over $70,000 from Ella Stevens, an 
eighty-six-year-old neighbor in Payson, Utah, who had been 
widowed for fifteen years* At first, defendant requested money 
for food to be used in her rabbit business, but her subsequent 
requests were for larger sums purportedly to pay for everything 
from car repairs to medical bills. Based upon these represen-
tations and alleged business receipts given her by defendant, 
Stevens continued to give defendant money until Stevens's bank 
became concerned and contacted both Stevens and the police. 
Although Stevens recorded each dispersal of funds to defendant as 
a loan and, based upon defendant's promises, fully expected to be 
paid back, defendant had repaid at most several hundred dollars 
(R. 86-97, 100-08) . 
When the police interviewed defendant, she acknowledged 
that she had received the money from Stevens, that she had been 
unemployed except for a brief span during the two year period in 
question, and that she had given Stevens false business receipts 
to make it easier for Stevens to give her money. The police 
investigation of the receipts confirmed that none of them were 
legitimate. However, defendant maintained that she had always 
intended to repay Stevens, although at the time she did not know 
how she would accomplish that (R. 109-17). 
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Defendant took the stand at trial and admitted 
receiving the money from Stevens by using false representations 
of needing money for a variety of purposes. She also admitted 
that she lied to Stevens about her intent to pay back some of the 
money on certain datesf but that she always intended to reimburse 
Stevens. She explained the false representations to Stevens by 
stating, "I hated asking Ella for money, and so I would make up 
these lies • . • to get the money" (R. 139-40, 145, 149-51). 
At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved 
to dismiss the charge against her on the ground that there was no 
evidence of the "unauthorized control" required by S 76-6-404.x 
The trial court denied the motion (R. 121-23, 130). After 
hearing all the evidence, the court found defendant guilty of 
theft (R. 56-58) (a copy of the court's decision is attached as 
Appendix A) . 
Although defendant was charged with theft under § 76-6-
404, her conviction of the form of theft defined in S 76-6-40 5(1) 
(theit by deception) is sustainable under S±a±fi_ju_lflylQl$ 570 
P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). 
Additionally, there was sufficient evidence before the 
trial court from which it could reasonably find that defendant 
had a "purpose to deprive," as that phrase is defined in § 76-6-
1HJLL3L. 
* Section 76-6-404 provides* 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
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ABGIiMEHJ 
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT 
TRIAL TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED 
THEFT. 
Defendant argues that the State did not present 
sufficient evidence at trial to prove two essential elements of 
theft under S 76-6-404: (1) obtaining or exercising unau£b£2Liz£d 
control; and (2) purpose to deprive. Before addressing this 
argument^ a briet discussion of Utah's theft statute and the 
nature of the charge in this case is necessary. 
Utah has a consolidated theft statute. UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 76-6-403 (1978) provides: 
Conduct denominated theft in this part 
constitutes a single offense embracing the 
separate offenses such as those heretofore 
known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny 
by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, 
extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen 
property. An accusation of theft may be 
supported by evidence that it was committed 
in any manner specified in sections 76-6-40 4 
through 76-6-410, subject to the power of the 
court to ensure a fair trial by granting a 
continuance or other appropriate relief where 
the conduct of the defense would be 
prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by 
surprise. 
In Sia±£_XA_Ia*l2I$ 570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized this principle: 
The Utah theft statute consolidates the 
offenses known under prior law as larceny, 
embezzlement, extortion, false pretenses, and 
receiving stolen property into a single 
offense entitled £&£££# and clearly evidences 
the legislative intent to eliminate the 
previously existing necessity of pleading and 
proving those separate and distinct offenses. 
All that is now required is to simply plead 
the general offense of theft and the 
accusation may be supported by evidence that 
it was committed in any manner specified in 
sections 404 through 410 of the Code, 
including that of receiving stolen property, 
as was done in this case. 
570 P.2d at 698 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). £££ 
Al££ S*fl.t£_JU_S£fik£fltfl , 638 P.2d 525, 526-27 (Utah 1981). 
In the present case, although the prosecutor charged 
defendant with theft under S 76-6-404, at trial, he advanced a 
theory of theft by deception (£££ UTAH CODE ANN. SS 76-6-40 5(1) 
and 76-6-401(5)(a) & (e) (1978)).2 Although this theory probably 
could have been articulated more clearly, it seems obvious from 
* Section 76-6-405(1) provides: 
A person commits thett if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by 
deception and with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
Sections 76-6-401(5)(a) & (e) provide: 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
. . . 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct 
an impression of law or fact that is false 
and that the actor does not believe to be 
true and that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(e) Promises pertormance that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction, which pertormance the actor does 
not intend to perform or knows will not be 
performed; provided, however, that failure to 
perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof tnat the actor did not 
intend to perform or knew the promise would 
not be performed. 
the prosecutor's argument to the trial court in response to 
defendant's motion to dismiss that he intended to prove that 
defendant obtained or exercised control over Stevens's money 
through knowing misrepresentations of fact and promises of 
repayment that defendant either did not intend to fulfill or knew 
would not be fulfilled (R. 123-27) (the prosecutor's argument is 
set forth in full as Appendix B). In fact, he stated, "It's not 
my claim that the defendant exercised imauJbb££i2£d control" 
(emphasis added) (R. 123) — a statement that clearly indicates 
an intent to pursue a variation of theft that does not require 
proot of "unauthorized control" as used in § 76-6-404, i.e., 
theft by deception defined in S 76-6-405(1).3 And, the trial 
court, while making no reference to S 76-6-405(1), found all the 
facts necessary for a conviction of theft by deception as defined 
in SS 76-6-405(1) and 76-6-401(5)(a) & (e). (Appendix A). 
Therefore, as to defendant's first claim on appeal that 
there was no evidence of unauthorized control, the question is 
whether defendant's conviction of theft by deception is 
sustainable when the information charged him with theft under 
S 76-6-404 rather than S 76-6-405(1). This issue was resolved by 
the Otah Supreme Court in SiflJtfi-JU-lfiXlfll, 570 P.2d 697 (Utah 
3 The prosecutor's position that theft could be proved by simply 
showing "the defendant obtained the property . . . with a purpose 
to deprive the owner thereof" (R. 123) appears to be incorrect. 
Obtaining control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof, without more, is not theft under Utah law. 
Sfifi SS 76-6-404 through 410. Although State v. Walker, 649 P.2d 
16, 17 (Utah 1982), might be read to support that position, the 
definition of "obtain or exercise unauthorized control" contained 
in S 76-6-401(4) clearly does not allow the interpretation ot 
S 76-6-404 proposed below. 
1977) , where the defendant's conviction of theft by receiving 
under S 76-6-408 was upheld even though the information charged 
theft under S 76-6-404. The Court rejected a defense argument 
nearly identical to that presented here, on the grounds that the 
consolidated theft statute rendered the slight variance between 
the charge and the conviction insignificant, Id. at 698. In the 
instant case, because defendant did not claim in the trial court 
that the manner in which theft was charged and proved prejudiced 
his defense by lack of fair notice or by surprise, and presents 
no such claim on appeal, laylfll is controlling and requires 
atfirmance of his conviction. Id. at 698 n. 6. No issue exists 
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding 
of theft by deception. 
Defendant's additional claim that the State's evidence 
was insufficient to show a purpose to deprive may be disposed of 
summarily. Section 76-6-401(3) defines "purpose to deprive" as: 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for 
so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost} or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment 
of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) o dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
Intent may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from 
the surrounding circumstances. fiiflifi_KA-iJllIPljy# 674 P.2d 1220, 
1223 (Utah 1983). From the evidence presented at trial, the 
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court could have reasonably concluded that defendant had the 
purpose to deprive Stevens of her money, as that phrase is 
defined in S 76-6-401(3). £fi£ Siflifi_y.A_IfiaacfiDjj, 704 P.2d 555, 
558 (Utah 1985)) Statfi_X*_DiDi£lfi, 584 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah 1978). 
Defendant's obtaining of the money with false representations of 
fact and promises of repayment unsupported by any visible means 
of making repayment was sufficient to sustain the court's finding 
of a purpose to deprive; it simply was not obligated to believe 
defendant's assertions to the contrary. See, JS£aifi_y.ji_MflD£jadfl, 
P.2d , Ot. Ct. App. No. 860243-CA, slip op. at 1 (filed May 
13, 1987) . 
£QH£U2SIQU 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed.. 
DATED this .JZ^Tday
 0f June, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
££m£I£AX£_QE_MAILIlK3 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Gary B. Weight, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin, 43 .ast 200 
North, P.O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603, this _^_r^ay of June, 
1967. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
**¥»« nit, 
Case No. CR-86-4 
DECISION 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff, J 
vs. * 
CAROL FOWLER, I 
Defendant. I 
) 
This matter came on duly and regularly for trial 
before the Court sitting without a jury at the specific 
request of the defendant. The plaintiff appeared and was 
represented by counsel Kent M. Barry, Esq. The defendant 
appeared and was represented by counsel Gary H. Weight, Esq. 
The Court thereupon heard the evidence adduced by the parties 
in support of their respective positions, reviewed the 
memoranda of counsel and upon being advised in the premises, 
now finds beyond a reasonable doubt as follows: 
1. (a) That during the two years immediately 
prior to December 1985, the defendant obtained from Ella 
Stevens the approximate sum of $70,200.00. 
(b) That such money was obtained in Utah 
County, Utah. 
(c) That defendant contends that such sum was 
obtained from Ella Stevens as loans. 
(d) That during said period of time the defen-
dant had no employment or earned income other than as a 
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flag person for approximately two months early in 1984. 
(e) That Ella Stevens, a widow, is now 84 years 
old and resides next door to the defendant. 
(f) That the defendant during such two year 
period visited almost daily with Ella Stevens thereby in-
gratiating herself to Ella Stevens. 
(g) That defendant represented to Ella Stevens 
that defendant was gainfully employed and had the means to 
repay said money within a reasonable time; that such repre-
sentations were false; that defendant repeatedly lied to Ella 
Stevens about the need and purpose for which defendant sought 
money from Ella Stevens; that defendant repeatedly falsified 
records and receipts for the purpose of concealing from Ella 
Stevens the real purposes for which said money was obtained 
by the defendant from said victim; that defendant knew there 
was no realistic possibility that defendant would be able to 
repay said money to the victim and defendant's assertions to 
the victim that such money would be repaid were nothing 
more than a fraud and a sham to facilitate obtaining money 
from the victim and to deprive the victim thereof; that 
defendant was aware that her promises to repay said money 
to the victim were reasonably certain not to be performed 
and the defendant thus obtained such money from the victim 
with the purpose to deprive the victim thereof. (76-6-401 
UGAs State v. Walker 658 P.2d 16) 
2. The Court therefore finds that the defendant 
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charge contained 
-3-
in the Information. 
3. Defendant is ordered to appear before the 
Court for the imposition of sentence on the Ath day of April 
1986 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
Dated this td'? £ day of March 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
'IWfcvO'n'' 
Cullen Yj/ Christensen, Judge 
cc: County Attorney 
Gary H. Height, Atty. 

APPENDIX B 
1 not paid at this point in time. But it does not in my 
2 1 opinion constitute criminal activity on this defendant's 
3 part. And we'd ask the Court to dismiss the Information. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Barry? 
5 MR. BARRY: If I may respond to that, 
6 your Honor. 
7 I don't think you can really get a clear picture 
8 about the case without looking at a couple of the letters 
9 themselves. There isn't a dispute in this case that the 
10 defendant received that much money, at least $70,000. She 
11 admits owing that to the victim. It's not my claim that 
12 the defendant exercised unauthorized control. It's my claim 
13 that the defendant obtained the property, over a thousand 
14 dollars, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
15 Now, I'm asking the court to infer an intent to 
16 deprive the owner. I'm asking the Court to infer that from 
17 the acts of the defendant. It's been shown to the Court, 
18 that defendant would give the victim all kinds of reasons 
19 why she needed the money and give her receipts. The defen-
20 dant admits the receipts are phoney. I think that's very 
21 important, Judge, because if the defendant were going to 
22 pay the money back, she would have to be an honest person, 
23 and an honest person simply doesn't make up these phoney 
24 receipts. 
25 Let me give you just a couple of things out of the 
II letters from November 1985, Judge. You can read these on 
2 1 your own. But I don't think you've got a clear picture 
3 1 without some sort of inspection of them. 
4 The ones I had her refer to, just read a letter: 
5 ''November 19. Hey, I don't have a receipt for you 
6 except a ticket. I had to send it up to Salt Lake. Last 
7j night was so cold, and I didn't have enough antifreeze in 
8 J my truck, and when I tried to start it I cracked the engine 
9 block in three places. If I don't get it fixed immediately 
10 it will completely ruin the engine and transmission, and 
11 that will cost about three thousand if it goes out. I've 
12 got a 4:30 appointment to get it fixed, and the service 
13 station will also start working on the engine block. It 
14 will cost $625. So if I could please that, please, Ella, 
15 I promise to pay you $3,500 on Thursday and $2,500 on the 
16 30th of November." 
17 No such payments were made, Judge. 
18 "Thanks a million. You're a wonderful friend. 
19 I love you very much." 
20 "November 21. Hey, we didn't get paid again 
21 because the boss still isn't back from Washington. His dad 
22 had another heart attack, so he had to have open-heart 
23 surgery. He'll be back next Friday. The foreman can't pay 
24 us either because the check from the state is in the boss' 
25 name." 
1 Now, the defendant isn't employed, Judge, and 
2 1 this is the kind of stuff she's telling the victim. 
3 "And I'll pay you $6,000 on Friday, but I need 
4 to pay insurance by 5:00 o'clock today. A cop stopped me 
5 and told me if I didn't have it paid by 5:00 o'clock he'd 
6 give me a ticket and impound both of my cars, take my check, 
7 the insurance and the truck, $350, for the car it's $200. 
8 Also, since I'm totally out of gas, could 1 please borrow 
9 a hundred dollars for that? 1 don't even have any gas to go 
10 to work." 
11 Again. She wouldn't work. 
12 "Have to be there at 12:30 this afternoon. Ella, 
13 I promised you I wouldn't borrow anymore money and I honestly 
14 wouldn't be if I had gotten paid." 
15 And she doesn't work, Judge. 
16 "This money will be the last up until I get paid 
17 next •-• I'm going down to --• could I please borrow $650? 
18 Could you please put it in my envelope and put it in my 
19 envelope I did receive. Also, if you don't put it in my 
20 mail box I won't be able to go to work, because I have no 
21 gas. Thanks a million. I love you very much." 
22 Again, Judge, I don't want to bore the Court with 
23 all of these, but I think you can get a picture of how 
24 preposterous some of this stuff is. Again, Judge: 
25 "November 16. Hi. As I was coming back from 
1 getting my truck fixed I was stopped by the cop, and they gavej 
2 1 me a ticket for not having studded snow tires. This is 
3 because it's a truck and they have to be on them by the 1st 
4 of November. The ticket is $300, and I have to pay it by 
5 Monday at noon. Also, I had to have the tires put on right 
6 away or they would have impounded the truck. I didn't pay 
7 all of the money for the engine block because they still 
8 haven1t fixed all of it. So I had to pay $160 for the tires. 
9 Also, if I don't pay the ticket, I'll be arrested and put in 
10 jail for two years. Also, my vehicles and check will be 
11 taken. Since I didn't get paid Friday," 
12 She wasn't working, Judge. 
13 "I don't have any gas or food. Can I please 
14 borrow $80. I promise to pay you $3,500 on Thursday, $3,000 
15 on the 30th. Please, Ella, help me one more time." 
16 Judge, these are just the November letters. It's 
17 a pretty standard thing, if you want to review the letters, 
18 I I have gone through them, she promised to pay when her income 
19 tax refund came back. She wasn't employed. She didn't have 
20 a large income tax. She promised to pay her $1,500 from an 
21 Insurance check that was supposed to come and never paid. 
22 The routine is, Judge: "I'll pay you on the 9th 
23 of August" That comes around. "I'll pay you on the 16th 
24 of August. I'll pay you when I get paid. Pay you on the 
25 16th, after the 16th. Well, I'll pay you on the 6th of 
1 September. Promise to pay you this week. I111 pay you 
2 when I get paid." 
3 1 That's what's going on, Judge. If you'll go 
4 through the letters, you don't need to read everyone of 
5 them, but you can get an indication. Back in February of 
6 1985: 
7 "Took $5,000 for U-joints, two control arms, all 
8 of the wiring in my truck." 
9I All of these were supposedly to be some truck 
10 repairs, Judge. She could have bought several trucks for 
11 this amount of money. I think the thing that I would like 
12 to ask the Court to believe is that there was no question 
13 that the defendant was lying continuously to the victim. And 
14 I'm going to ask the Court to believe that the defendant was 
15 lying to the victim about when or if she was going to pay it 
16 back. That's the inference I'm asking the Court to draw; 
17 that from the fact she lied about what she needed the money 
18 for, what she used the money for, when she was going to pay 
19 her back; that she was going to pay her back each and 
20 every payday when she wasn't working. She paid her a couple 
21 of hundred dollars. She didn't have a job. It was just some 
22 of the money she was giving back to keep the pot open. 
23 I I think we have at least made out a prima facie 
24 case. Thanks. 
25 MR. WEIGHT: May I just briefly respond 
